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JAFFEE v. REDMOND: TOWARDS
RECOGNITION OF A FEDERAL
COUNSELOR-BATTERED
WOMAN PRIVILEGE
MICHAEL B. BRESSMAN & FERNANDO R. LAGUARDAt
INTRODUCTION
In theory if not in fact, the purpose of a trial in the American legal
tradition is to discern the truth related to a particular dispute.1
Although scholars have debated how well the adversary system actu-
ally promotes fair and accurate outcomes, this truth-seeking para-
digm remains generally well-accepted. 2 To ascertain the truth,
information must be presented to the triers of fact for their considera-
tion. The law of evidence thus provides the rules for introducing and
considering such information in the adversary system.3
The fundamental evidentiary principle guiding the introduction of
evidence is that "the public has a right to every man's evidence."4
This principle is embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which de-
clares that "[aill relevant evidence is admissible."5 Relevant evidence
allows for reliable fact-finding, furthering the truth-seeking mission of
the courts. By contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude other
evidence that would detrimentally affect the truth-seeking process.
t Associates, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., Washington,
D.C. The authors filed a brief amici curiae on behalf of the National Network to End
Domestic Violence ("NNEDV") et al., in Jaffee v. Redmond. The authors would like to
thank their colleagues and friends at Mintz, Levin and NNEDV, especially William
Brashares and Michael Kleine, their co-counsel in Jaffee, and Elizabeth Dees. Mr.
Bressman would also like to thank Lisa Schultz for her invaluable contributions and
unending support. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors
and not those of Mintz, Levin or NNEDV.
1. See FED. R. EviD. 102 (providing that "[these rules shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration... and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.").
2. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 56 (1991).
3. See generally FED. R. Evm. 101-1103.
4. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 WiGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). The phrase "every man's evidence" dates back
to at least as early as the mid-18th century when it was invoked during a debate in the
House of Lords. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 n.5 (1972) (citing 12 T.
HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HIsToRY OF ENGLAND 675, 693 (remarks of the Duke of Ar-
gyle and of Lord Chancellor Harwicke)).
5. FED. R. Evm. 402.
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For example, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.6 Likewise, unrelia-
ble or prejudicial evidence, which would have the tendency to derogate
this process, is excluded. 7
The development of evidentiary privileges represents a different
concern. Unlike the other rules barring evidence, evidentiary privi-
leges exclude evidence that may well be relevant, reliable, and not
prejudicial.8 Privileges, however, elevate other important societal in-
terests and policies, such as privacy interests, above truth seeking.9
Because privileges prevent normally admissible evidence from being
revealed to the triers of fact, courts generally disfavor them.' 0
Nevertheless, some privileges, such as the attorney-client and
spousal privileges, have gained clear acceptance." The question is
whether other privileges should join their ranks. In answering this
question, courts typically consider the four criteria formulated by
Dean Wigmore.' 2 These criteria balance the individual's and society's
interests against the need for the evidence.
In Federal Rule of Evidence 501, Congress gave the federal courts
additional guidance in developing new privileges.1 3 Congress in-
structed the federal courts to consider "the principles of common law
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., FED. R. EvrD. 802 (generally prohibiting hearsay statements from ad-
mission into evidence). See also FED. R. Evm. 404 (generally prohibiting character evi-
dence from admission into evidence); FED. R. EvID. 403 (balancing probative value of
evidence against harm likely to result from its admission).
8. Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1450, 1454 (1985).
9. Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. at 1454.
10. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980) (citing Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 202, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974)).
11. See 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
12. Id. These criteria are:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relationship between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the commu-
nications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct dis-
posal of litigation.
Id.
13. See FED. R. Evm. 501.
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... in the light of reason and experience."14 Jaffee v. Redmond15 rep-
resents the United States Supreme Court's most recent effort to grap-
ple with this mandate. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court held that
"confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and
her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from
compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence." 16 The Court then extended this new privilege to protect com-
munications between a licensed social worker and her patients.17 The
Jaffee decision demonstrates the Court's willingness to consider per-
sonal and community interests in crafting new evidentiary privileges.
Part I of this Article reviews the Jaffee decision.' 8 Part II dis-
cusses the meaning of the Supreme Court's opinion, focusing on the
Court's analysis of the important interests at stake in recognizing the
asserted testimonial privilege.19 In Part II, this Article argues that
the Court followed the intent of Congress in crafting a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege.20 Furthermore, the extension of the privilege to
cover confidential communications made to social workers indicates
that there is room for further development of the privilege. 21 In Part
III, the Article argues that Jaffee provides the foundation for recogni-
tion of a counselor-battered woman privilege in federal court.22
14. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
15. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
16. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (1996) (footnote omitted).
17. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
18. See infra notes 23-106 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 107-57 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 107-31 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 132-57 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 158-237 and accompanying text. Cases brought under the re-
cently enacted Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA") may provide a forum for
the recognition of this privilege. See generally Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No.
103-322, §§ 40001-703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). At the core of the VAWA is a civil rights remedy, which guarantees citizens
the right to be free from gender-based violence. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981).
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I. JAFFEE V. REDMOND
A. THE FACTS
On June 27, 1991, Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer employed by
the Village of Hoffman Estates, answered a dispatcher's call regarding
a reported fight at an apartment complex. 23 Officer Redmond, who
was on patrol duty alone, was the first officer to arrive at the scene.24
As she drove into the apartment complex, two women ran toward her
waving their arms above their heads. 25 One of the women told Red-
mond that there had been a stabbing in the building.26 Redmond noti-
fied her dispatcher, requesting assistance and an ambulance. 27
Redmond got out of her squad car and approached the building.28
Before Redmond reached the building, however, five men ran out
screaming - one of them waving a pipe.29 Redmond ordered the man
to drop the pipe and told everyone else to get on the ground.30 The
men ignored her, so Redmond drew her service revolver. 31 At almost
the same moment, two more men emerged from the building; one of
the men, Ricky Allen, Sr., was chasing the other.3 2 According to Red-
mond, Allen was brandishing a butcher's knife and gaining on the sec-
ond man. 33 Three times Redmond commanded Allen to drop the knife
and get on the ground.34 When he ignored her and raised his arm to
stab the second man, Redmond shot Allen once.35 Only three or four
seconds had passed since she had drawn her revolver.3 6
After shooting Allen, Redmond ran toward him and noticed the
butcher knife lying near his body.37 She again radioed her dispatcher
for assistance and an ambulance.38 The scene became increasingly
heated as a number of people "pour[ed] out of the buildings." 39 Some
moved toward her, and when one came within arm's length, she raised
23. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1925 (1996).
24. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1923
(1996).
25. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
26. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348. The women turned out to be the sisters of Ricky Allen,
Sr. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
27. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
28. Id.
29. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348.
30. Id. at 1349.
31. Id.
32. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
33. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1949.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Four of Allen's brothers and sisters witnessed the shooting and testified
that Allen was unarmed when Officer Redmond shot him. Id.
37. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1949.
38. Id.
39. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
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her gun and ordered everyone back. 40 Redmond testified that no one
in the crowd came to her assistance.41 She also stated that no one
moved the knife from where it had landed until it was recovered by an
investigating officer.42
When Officer Joe Graham arrived at the scene, he saw Redmond
standing behind Allen's body with her gun aimed at the crowd. 43 Ac-
cording to Graham, Redmond seemed "visibly shaken."44 Graham tes-
tified that people in the crowd were shouting that "she didn't have to
shoot him in the head."45 Graham also stated that he saw a butcher's
knife near'Allen's body.46
After the incident, Redmond received counseling from Karen
Beyer, a clinical social worker licensed by the State of Illinois and em-
ployed by the Village of Hoffman Estates.47 They first met a few days
after the shooting, and eventually participated in approximately fifty
counseling sessions during the next six months.48 The only conversa-
tions Redmond had with Beyer occurred during these sessions.49
B. DIscoVERY AND THE TRIAL
Allen's family sued Redmond and the Village of Hoffman Estates,
alleging violations of the decedent's constitutional rights and seeking
damages under Title 42 of the United States Code section 1983 and
the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. 50 Before trial, the plaintiffs at-
tempted to obtain information concerning the contents of Redmond's
conversations with Beyer.51 Both Redmond and Beyer either refused
to answer or gave evasive and incomplete answers to deposition ques-
tions about the counseling sessions.5 2 Beyer also refused to produce
any notes or reports from these meetings.5 3 Each asserted that com-
40. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1349-50.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
48. Id.; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350.
49. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350 n.4.
50. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926 (citing 740 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 180/0.01-2.2 (West
1993)). Had the plaintiffs sued in an Illinois state court, Redmond's claim of privilege
.would surely have been upheld," since Illinois law provides that conversations between
a therapist and her patients are privileged from compelled disclosure in any civil or
criminal proceeding. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.15.
51. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350-51.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1351. Beyer eventually provided three pages of redacted notes. Id.
1997]
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munications with a clinical social worker in Illinois are privileged.5 4
The district court, however, ruled that no social worker-patient privi-
lege is recognized under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which gov-
erned the case.55
After Redmond and Beyer refused to produce evidence concerning
their counseling sessions, the district court ruled that Redmond would
not be permitted to testify at trial about the shooting.56 Although the
district court reconsidered, it instructed the jury, over defendants' ob-
jections, that:
there is no legal justification in this lawsuit, based as it is on
a federal constitutional claim, to refuse to produce Ms.
Beyer's notes of her conversations with Mary Lu Redmond,
and that such refusal was unjustified. Under these circum-
stances, you are entitled to presume that the contents of the
notes would be unfavorable to Mary Lu Redmond and the Vil-
lage of Hoffman Estates.5 7
The jury awarded plaintiffs $45,000 on the federal constitutional law
claim and $500,000 on the state wrongful death claim.58
C. THE APPEAL
Defendants appealed the jury verdict to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.59 They argued that the jury's ver-
dict should be vacated because the district court's instruction allowed
the jury to reach adverse conclusions from the defendants' refusal to
disclose the information that they contended was protected by the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege. 60
The Seventh Circuit overturned the verdict and remanded the
case to the district court for a new trial.61 The court reasoned that
Rule 501 provided more flexibility to recognize new evidentiary privi-
leges than the district court's orders and jury instruction suggested. 62
Under Rule 501, the court observed, evidentiary privileges are "gov-
54. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350-51. Accord 740 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 110/1-110/15
(West 1993).
55. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. Interestingly, the district court appeared to accept
that Rule 501 would allow recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, but that it
did not extend to social worker-patient confidential communications. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d
at 1350-51 n.5.
56. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1351.
57. Id. at 1351-52 n.9 (quoting Jury Instruction No. 8).
58. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
59. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348.
60. Id. at 1352-53. The defendants also argued that the district court's Fourth
Amendment deadly force jury instruction was improper. Id. at 1352. The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that this instruction was adequate. Id. at 1354.
61. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358.
62. Id. at 1354-58.
[Vol. 30
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erned by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence." 63 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
Supreme Court had stated that Rule 501 "manifested an affirmative
intention not to freeze the law of privilege," but instead to "'provide
the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-
case basis.' "164
The court noted that six federal circuit courts had considered the
issue of whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recog-
nized, with two, the Second and the Sixth Circuits, concluding that
"reason and experience" require the recognition of the privilege.6 5 By
contrast, the remaining four, the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, construed Rule 501 as limiting privileges to those recognized
at common law.66
The Seventh Circuit sided with the minority.6 7 It reasoned that
the need for counseling had increased dramatically because of the rise
of violence and crime throughout the country.68 Furthermore, the
court found that a patient must be able "to communicate freely with-
out the fear of public disclosure" to receive successful treatment.6 9
Without a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court observed, those
who need treatment simply will not seek it.70
The Seventh Circuit further noted that all fifty states have
adopted some version of a psychotherapist-patient privilege,71 and
63. Id. at 1354.
64. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (citations
omitted)).
65. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1983).
66. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege for admissions by a pedophile of criminal sexual assault); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining the assertion of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege by a grand jury murder investigation target); United
States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a psychotherapist-patient
privilege in a criminal firearms case); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.
1976) (refusing claim of privilege in a bank robbery trial).
67. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-56.
68. Id. at 1355.
69. Id. at 1355-56.
70. Id.
71. Id at 1356 n.17; ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1991); ALASKA R. Evm. 504; ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (Supp. 1996); ARK. R. Evm. 503; CAL. EvD. CODE §§ 1010, 1012,
1014 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(g) (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-146c (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); DEL. UNIFORm RuLE EVID. tit. 503; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-9-21 (1995); HAw. R. Evm. 504, 504.1; IDAHO R. Evm. 503; 225 ILL. Cown.
STAT. AN. 15/5 (West 1993); IND. CODE § 25-33-1-17 (1995); IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1995);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1992); Ky. R. Evm. 507; LA. CODE EvID. ANN., art. 510 (West
1995); ME. R. EvD. 503; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. Paoc. § 9-109 (1995); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 1986 & Supp 1996); MICH. Con'. LAws ANN.
1997]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
many had expressly extended the privilege to communications be-
tween patients and licensed clinical social workers. The court con-
cluded that support by all fifty states for a psychotherapist-patient
privilege was strong evidence that "'experience with the privilege has
been favorable.' "72
The Seventh Circuit therefore recognized a psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege under Rule 501 and extended it to communications be-
tween clinical social workers and their patients.73 The court did not
stop there, however, as it proceeded to balance the evidentiary need
for the information contained in Redmond's counseling records
against her privacy interests. 74 The court struck the balance in favor
of the privilege to encourage Redmond to use counseling to resolve the
feelings associated with her traumatic experience. 75 It concluded that
the need for testimony about her thoughts recalled in counseling was
less pressing in this case because there were numerous witnesses, in-
cluding Redmond herself, who testified about the actual details of the
shooting.76
D. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice John Paul Stevens,
affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit in a seven-to-two deci-
sion.7 7 The Supreme Court began its analysis in much the same way
as the Seventh Circuit had, observing that Rule 501 authorizes federal
courts to define new privileges by interpreting "common law principles
... in the light of reason and experience."7 8 The Court reasoned that
Congress "did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses
§ 333.18237 (West Supp. 1996); Mi-N. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (1988 & Supp. 1997); Miss.
R. EvID. 503; Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.209 (Michie 1996); N.H. R.
EvID. 503; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1995); N.M. R. Evm. 11-504; N.Y. Crv.
PRAc. L. & R. LAw § 4507 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (Supp. 1995); N.D.
R. Evm. § 503; Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (1993); OR. R. Evm. 504, 504.1; 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5944
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-37.3-3, 3-37.3-4(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFEED LAws §§ 19-13-6 to -11 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-
207 (Supp. 1995); TEx. R. Crv. EvD. 509, 510; UTAH R. EvID. 506; VT. R. EVm. 503; VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (West Supp.
1997); W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-123 (Michie Supp. 1996).
72. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357 (quoting In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1328).
73. Id. at 1357.
74. Id. at 1357-58.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1358.
77. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
78. Id. at 1924. This phrase comes from Rule 501, which in turn was borrowed
from the Supreme Court's opinion in Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934) (citing
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)).
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in federal trials," but instead directed the courts to" 'continue the evo-
lutionary development of testimonial privileges.'" 79
To determine whether to recognize a psychotherapist-patient.
privilege under Rule 501, the Court examined whether such a privi-
lege "'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need
for probative evidence .... '"80 The Court began by analyzing the "pri-
vate" interests the privilege serves.81 Like the spousal and attorney-
client privileges, the Court observed, the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege is "rooted in -the imperative need for confidence and trust."8 2
There is "wide agreement," the Court continued, that effective psycho-
therapy depends upon "an atmosphere of confidence and trust" in
which the patient discloses sensitive and personal information to her
counselor.8 3
The Court then turned to the "public" interests served by the priv-
ilege.8 4  It noted that the psychotherapist-patient privilege
"facilitat[es] the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals
suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem" and that "[tihe
mental health of our citizenry, . . . is a public good of transcendent
importance."8 5 For example, the Court observed, in cases such as
Redmond's, serious social consequences would flow from denying po-
lice officers "effective counseling and treatment after traumatic
incidents."8 6
Finally, the Court relied on the experience of the states to confirm
the importance of the privilege, noting that all fifty states had enacted
some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege.8 7 The Court reasoned
that this consensus was "reason and experience" enough to support
recognition of the privilege.88 Indeed, denial of a federal privilege
would frustrate the purposes of the states in enacting a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege for their own courts.89 The Court therefore held
79. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
80. Id. at 1928 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
81. Id. at 1928.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183,
242 (1972)).
84. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929. "Our cases make clear," noted the Court, "that an
asserted privilege must also 'serv[e] public ends." Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
85. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
86. Id. at 1929 n.10.
87. Id. at 1929 n.11; supra note 71. The Court noted that "the policy decisions of
the States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege
or amend the coverage of an existing one." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929-30.
88. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930.
89. Id. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion took the majority to task for this line of
reasoning. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1935-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Noting that most states
had adopted the privilege through legislative means, Justice Scalia excoriated the ma-
1997]
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that "confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist
and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected
from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 ....
In the remainder of the majority's opinion, the Court extended the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to treatment by a clinical social
worker.91 The Court reasoned that social workers provide a signifi-
cant amount of mental health treatment, often serving clients whose
modest means prohibit them from seeking more expensive psychother-
apy.92 Furthermore, the Court noted that most states extend a testi-
monial privilege to licensed social workers. 93 Finally, the Court could
find no "discernible public purpose" that would be served by distin-
guishing between counseling provided by social workers and
psychotherapists. 94
jority for developing federal privilege rules in reliance on sources other than the com-
mon law. Id. at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority responded that this fact was
"of no consequence" because policy determinations by state legislatures may reflect both
"'reason' and 'experience.'" Id. at 1930 (citing Funk, 290 U.S. at 376-81). For one
thing, "once a state legislature has enacted a privilege[,] there is no longer an opportu-
nity for common-law creation of the protection." Id.; EDWARD W. CLEARY ET. AL, MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 75, at 180 (3d ed. 1984) (noting that "Itihe development of judge-
made privileges, however, virtually halted over a century ago."). For another, "[tihat
the privilege may have developed faster legislatively than it would have in the courts
demonstrates only that the States rapidly recognized the wisdom of the rule as the field
of psychotherapy developed." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930. Justice Scalia's criticism fails
to fully appreciate that Rule 501 directs federal courts to consider the "principles" of
common law "in light of reason and experience."
90. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
91. Id. at 1931-32.
92. Id. at 1931.
93. Id. at 1931 n.17 (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-3283 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 17-46-107 (1995); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1010, 1012, 1014 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146q (1991); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 24 § 3913
(1987); D.C. CODE § 14-307 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21
(1995); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213 (1994); ILL. Comp. STAT., ch. 225, § 20/16 (1994); IND.
CODE § 25-23.6-6-1 (1993); IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6315
(Supp. 1990); Ky. R. EviD. 507; LA. CODE EviD. ANN., Art. 510 (West 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN., Tit. 32, § 7005 (1988); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PRoc. § 9-121 (1995);
MAss. GEN. LAws § 112:135A (1994); MICH. COMP. STAT. ANN. 339.1610 (1992); MNN.
STAT. § 595.02(g) (1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-53-29 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.636
(Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-22-401 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1,335
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.215, 49.225, 49.235 (Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 330-A:19 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15BB-13 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-31-
24 (Supp. 1995); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw § 4508 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.7 (1986);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (1995); OELA. STAT., Tit. 59, § 1261.6 (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 5-37.3-3, 5-37.3-4 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Supp. 1995); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws § 36-26-30 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-23-107 (1990); TEx. RULE CrV. EVID.
510; UTAH R. Evm. 506; VT. R. EvIn. 503; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 18.19.180 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 30-30-12 (1993); WIs. STAT. § 905.04
(1993-1994); Wyo. STAT. § 33-38-109 (Supp. 1995)).
94. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (quoting Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358 n.9).
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Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist
in part, filed a dissenting opinion.95 The dissent began by criticizing
the majority for relegating the question in the case - whether Rule
501 supports a social worker-patient privilege - to an "afterthought"
worthy of "less than a page of text."96 Rather, the dissent stated, the
majority chose to answer "the more general, and much easier ques-
tion" of whether Rule 501 encompasses a psychotherapist-patient
privilege." 97 Only after finding such a privilege, the dissent contin-
ued, did the majority recklessly extend it to social workers and their
clients, without due regard for the professional status that qualifies
the psychotherapist-patient relationship for a privilege. 98
With respect to the "easier" question of whether to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the dissent accused the majority of
concocting a new privilege without any respect for the impact the de-
nial of such evidence would have on the truth-seeking function of tri-
als.99 The dissent described as a "novel argument" the majority's
position that a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege should be rec-
ognized so as not to undermine state legislation protecting such confi-
dential communications.100 Furthermore, the dissent posited, the
majority created "[a] sort of inverse pre-emption" that requires the
"truth-seeking functions of federal courts.., to be adjusted so as not
to conflict with the policies of the States."'0 '
The dissent then found "even less persuasive" the majority's rea-
soning for extending the privilege to social workers.' 0 2 In the dis-
sent's view, because social workers presumably do not possess the
same level of skill as psychotherapists, their counseling should not
necessarily receive the same degree of protection.' 0 3 Moreover, unlike
psychiatrists and psychologists who only perform psychotherapy, so-
cial workers consult with people for many reasons unrelated to psy-
chotherapy. 10 4 Indeed, the dissent noted that the majority of states
recognizing a social worker privilege "do not do so as a subpart of a
'psychotherapist' privilege."' 0 5 Finally, although the majority of
states have a social worker privilege, the great disparity as to its
95. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1934 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1932-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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scope, according to the dissent, undermines the recognition of such a
privilege by the Court.10 6
II. ANALYZING JAFFEE V. REDMOND
In Jaffee, the Court recognized a new privilege that did not exist
at common law and then extended it the social worker-patient rela-
tionship.10 7 But it did not do so in the lawless fashion suggested by
the dissent. Rather, it did so pursuant to the authority granted to it
by Congress in Rule 501. In enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 501,
Congress committed the courts to consider "reason and experience" in
developing the law of privilege without prescribing (or proscribing)
any source of that wisdom.' 08 The views of the states represent but
one body of "reason and experience" for purposes of Rule 501. Indeed,
the Court's opinion should not be read to convert Rule 501 into a tool
of "inverse preemption," limiting the recognition of new privileges in
federal courts to instances in which all, or almost all, of the states
through their collective "reason and experience" have adopted a par-
ticular privilege. 10 9 Nor should the decision be interpreted as requir-
ing state legislatures to take the lead in developing new privileges.
The Federal Government may provide the "reason and experience"
necessary to support the development of new privileges. And, of
course, common law may continue to form the basis for new privileges.
When viewed in this manner, Jaffee represents an opportunity to de-
velop new privileges with input from state and federal authorities in
addition to the teachings of common law." 0
Jaffee makes clear that the development of new privileges also
requires analysis under traditional principles of evidence law."' In
reaching its conclusion to adopt a psychotherapist-patient privilege
under Rule 501, the Jaffee Court evaluated the privilege under the
Wigmore test. 112 The Court did not, however, plod through a step-by-
step analysis of each of Wigmore's elements, and thus opened itself to
the dissent's charge that it was creating a new privilege from whole
cloth. 1 3 But the dissent failed to appreciate that the majority actu-
ally incorporated the Wigmore elements under the broader framework
of determining whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege "pro-
106. See id. at 1939-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1923, 1931-32.
108. See FED. R. EvID. 501.
109. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the major-
ity's holding created a new rule of "inverse preemption").
110. See generally Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1923-32.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1927-31. See supra note 12.
113. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-31. See id at 1933-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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motes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for proba-
tive evidence."114
The "private interests" prong of the Court's analysis encompassed
the first two elements of Wigmore's test - disclosures made with the
expectation of confidence and the essentialness of the confidential-
ity.11 5 First, the Court found that there was little question that a pa-
tient divulges personal information to a psychotherapist with the full
expectation that any disclosures will be kept confidential.11 6 The
Court's conclusion in this regard is supported by extensive studies and
standards.11 7 Indeed, it is the policy of those administering psychoan-
alytic therapy to ensure the confidential treatment of communications
made by patients to them.118 Second, the Court determined that con-
fidentiality is essential to maintain the psychotherapist-patient rela-
tionship.11 9  Again, research and reports bear out this
determination. 1 20 Effective treatment requires a patient to reveal her
innermost thoughts, feelings, fears, and concerns, many of which, if
revealed to third parties, could cause the patient to suffer severe and
possibly damaging embarrassment. As one Advisory Committee to
the Rules stated:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to
maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is
completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to
talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to
function without being able to assure his patients of confiden-
tiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there
114. See id. at 1927-31.
115. Id. at 1928-29.
116. Id. at 1928.
117. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Confidentiality: An Empirical Test of the
Utilitarian Perspective, 12 BULL. OF THE AMER. AcAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 109,
110 (1984) (reviewing studies); John M. McGuire et al., The Adult Client's Conception of
Confidentiality in the Therapeutic Relationship, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAc. 375,
380 (1985) (noting survey results indicating that mental health patients expect
confidentiality).
118. See Brief of the American Psychoanalytic Association Division of Psychoanaly-
sis (39) of the American Psychological Association et al. as Amicus Curiae, at 17-18,
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No. 95-266) (citing American Psychoanalytic
Ass'n, Principles of Ethics for Psychoanalysts and Provisions for Implementation of the
Principles of Ethics for Psychoanalysts § 6 (1983)). The ethical canons of the profes-
sional associations for mental health providers require the confidentiality of therapist-
patient communications. Id. Accord American Psychological Ass'n, Ethical Principles
of Psychologists and Code of Conduct § 5 (1992); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PRINcI-
PLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4
(1995); National Federation of Societies for Clinical Social Work, Code of Ethics § 5
(1988).
119. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. 1928-29.
120. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on the Confidentiality of Commu-
nications Between Sexual Assault or Domestic Violence Victims and Their Counselors,
Findings and Model Legislation 14-15 (1995).
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may be exceptions to this general rule . . ., there is wide
agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be likened
to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. . . . A
threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.121
Thus, the Court correctly concluded that the possibility of disclosure
likely would prevent a patient from entrusting her psychotherapist
with this sensitive and private information, disrupting their relation-
ship and depriving her of the full benefits of therapeutic treatment. 122
Having determined that the "private" interests justified the recog-
nition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court turned to the
more noteworthy part of its opinion, its consideration of the "public
ends" served by the privilege.1 23 This inquiry echoes Wigmore's third
criterion - whether the privilege at issue is one that society believes
ought to be "sedulously fostered. 1 24 With respect to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, the Jaffee Court concluded that society has a
significant interest in promoting the mental health of its citizenry, es-
pecially in cases such as Redmond's. 12 5 Indeed, the Petitioners did
not challenge this point in their briefs. 126
Although the Court effectively applied Wigmore's principles, it
still had to address its ambiguous mandate from Congress to interpret
a privilege "in light of reason and experience."1 2 7 Congress had
adopted the general privilege standard embodied in Rule 501 after
much debate. Under the original proposal, nine specific rules - in-
121. Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)
(quoting Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, Report No. 45, Confidentiality and Priv-
ileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry 92 (June 1960)).
122. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928. Justice Scalia questioned whether a privilege is
necessary to encourage confidential communications. Id. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
As he pointed out, many people use psychotherapists even though it is unclear to them
whether their communications will be kept legally confidential. Id. Though Justice
Scalia's observation has some merit, it ignores the fact that most patients, rightly or
wrongly, expect their communications to be protected from disclosure, including in a
court. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893, 898 (1982).
123. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
124. See 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
125. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 & n.10. The use of psychotherapy has increased dra-
matically in this country as a way to treat mental illness, as evidenced, for example, by
the inclusion of mental health care provisions in many health and disability insurance
policies.
126. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)
(No. 95-266).
127. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929, 1932. The Court also conducted a perfunctory weigh-
ing of the evidentiary benefit from disclosure versus the interest in maintaining the
privilege. Id. Accord 8 JoHN H. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
It adopted an absolute privilege because "[a]n uncertain privilege,... is little better
than no privilege at all." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
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cluding a psychiatrist-patient privilege - "purported to define the
privileges to be recognized in the federal courts in all actions, cases,
and proceedings; any alleged privilege not enumerated . . . was
deemed not to exist and could not be given effect unless of constitu-
tional dimension. 1 28  As the Senate Report accompanying the
adopted Federal Rules of Evidence explained:
in approving the general rule as to privileges, the action of
Congress should not be understood as disapproving any rec-
ognition of a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any
other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme
Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as re-
flecting the view the recognition of a privilege based on a con-
fidential relationship.., should be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 129
Representative William L. Hungate, Chairman of the House Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, reinforced this view when he
introduced the Rules for final consideration in the House:
Rule 501 is not intended to freeze the law of privilege as it
now exists. The phrase "governed by. the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience," is in-
tended to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop
rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis. For example, the
Supreme Court's rules of evidence contained no rule of privi-
lege for a newspaperperson. The language of Rule 501 per-
mits the courts to develop a privilege for newspaperpeople on
a case-by-case basis. The language cannot be interpreted as a
congressional expression in favor of having no such privilege,
nor can the conference action be interpreted as denying to
newspeople any protection they may have from State new-
sperson's privilege laws. 130
Thus, the Court correctly concluded that Rule 501 instructed the fed-
eral courts to continue the development of privileges, including the
creation of new ones, based on modern reason and experience. 131 Con-
gress, however, provided little guidance as to what factors a federal
court should consider or to where it should look in evaluating "reason
and experience."
128. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7053.
129. Id. at 7059.
130. Id. at 7110 (statement of Representative Hungate, Dec. 18, 1974).
131. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
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A. THE STATES
One possible source for evaluating "reason and experience" is
state law. Even the dissent in Jaffee conceded that it would be appro-
priate to consult state common law in fashioning new federal privi-
leges under Rule 501.132 As the majority aptly recognized, however,
some social issues are too urgent to await percolation in the court sys-
tem and compel legislative development. 133 There is nothing surpris-
ing in relying on such legislative action for "reason and experience,"
particularly where it supplants the need for common law evolution.
States frequently serve as laboratories for experimentation with dif-
ferent solutions to social problems.134 In this case, for example, the
states comprehensively addressed the need for and the methods of en-
suring the mental health of their citizens, including the adoption of
psychotherapist-patient and social worker-patient privileges. As a re-
sult, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have chosen to adopt
some form of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 135 Moreover, forty-
five states and the District of Columbia have enacted a social worker-
patient privilege. 136
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, nothing in the Court's opinion
creates a rule of "inverse preemption. 1 37 The Court was free to rely
on other sources of "reason and experience" - for example, studies
assembled by the Advisory Committee to the Rules that pointed in the
other direction. Of course, the Advisory Committee cited no such
studies. 138 Under these circumstances, it would have defied "reason
and experience" for the Court to ignore the considered judgments of
the states simply because those judgments found their way into legis-
lation rather than the common law. Similarly, it had latitude in de-
termining the expanse of the federal privilege. Indeed, the Court
adopted an absolute privilege, which is broader than the privilege rec-
ognized in many of the states. 139 Nor did any particular state supply
132. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1930.
134. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (stating "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
135. See supra note 71.
136. See supra note 93. But see Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1936, 1939 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that five states do not recognize a social worker-patient privilege and argu-
ing that five other states effectively do not recognize the privilege).
137. See generally Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1923-32.
138. See id. at 1928-29.
139. Id. at 1931-32.
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the rule of decision in determining the outcome of the case. 140 State
law merely served to counsel the development of federal common law
for psychotherapist-patient and social worker-patient privileges and it
is that federal law that resolved the given case.1 41 This outcome is not
unprecedented; on previous occasions, federal courts have looked to
state law in adopting a federal common law standard to be used in
federal courts. 14 2 If state law can supply the standards for federal
common law, it certainly can supply the basis for extrapolation in the
development of federal common law.
Two issues bear note concerning the Court's reliance on state leg-
islatures as sources of "reason and experience." First, the Court did
not establish a clear rule as to the number of states necessary to
demonstrate "reason and experience" for purposes of Rule 501.143 In
some sense, Jaffee was an easy case because all the states had recog-
nized some form of a psychotherapist-patient privilege and nearly as
many had recognized a social worker-patient privilege.144
Second is the question of legal trends. The Jaffee Court noted
that "state lawmakers moved quickly" in adopting the psychotherapist
privilege and that the speed "demonstrates only that the states rap-
idly recognized the wisdom of the rule .... -145 Similarly, the Court
observed that while twelve states regulated social workers in 1972, all
regulate them today. 146 During this time, social workers have pro-
vided a significantly increasing percentage of therapeutic services. 147
The Court thus indicated that legal trends among the states are rele-
vant, but provided no clear guidance on how many states must partici-
pate before a trend emerges. For example, if forty states possessed a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, but ten states had repealed such a
140. Thus, Illinois' privilege statute did not govern the outcome nor did it matter
that psychotherapist-patient and social worker-patient privilege laws vary from state to
state.
141. As Professor Martha Field has pointed out, Rule 501 is one of the rare in-
stances in which Congress has explicitly directed the federal courts to make federal
common law. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 883, 935 n.227 (1994). See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(I)(A)
(1982) (adopting state standards). See also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2674 (1994) (adopting state standards).
142. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (examining state death pen-
alty law, including statutes, in adopting an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual pun-
ishment principle).
143. Jaffee, 1116 S. Ct. at 1929-32.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 1930; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355 (noting that the need for psychiatric coun-
seling "has skyrocketed during the past several years.").
146. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.16.
147. Id. (citing NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH & CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH UNITED STATES, 1994,
at 85-87, 107-14).
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privilege in the past few years, should a federal court interpret this
state of affairs as support for or against recognizing such a privilege?
Likewise, should a federal court recognize a privilege if only ten states
adopted a particular privilege, but all of them had done so within the
past few years? Even small legal trends - that is, trends among only
a small number of states - are relevant in determining "reason and
experience" under Rule 501. Thus, both numbers and trends should
be germane to a federal court's analysis of reason and experience.
B. CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
While states may take the lead in some instances in demonstrat-
ing "reason and experience" for purposes of Rule 501, Congress and
the Federal Government may also serve as the source for measuring
the propriety of a privilege. Congress may legislate in ways that evi-
dence an interest in protecting a particular relationship or class of in-
dividuals. The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), discussed in
detail below, is one such example. 148 In enacting VAWA, Congress ex-
pressed a considered judgment that, among other things, victims of
domestic abuse require assistance to recover their physical and
mental well-being. It would be appropriate for federal courts to con-
sider this judgment in determining whether to create a privilege that
effectively encourages battered women to seek counseling by protect-
ing their therapy sessions from disclosure in the courtroom. 149
The Executive Branch might also contribute to the "reason and
experience" supporting a particular privilege. For example, the De-
partment of Justice might undertake a study on the incidence and ef-
fects of domestic violence on the national level.' 50 It might even
report to Congress on issues of confidentiality between domestic vio-
lence victims and their counselors. 15 ' Similarly, the President might
commission a task force on such issues.1 52
Although these actions contribute "reason and experience" to the
analysis, they do not reflect practical experience with a particular
privilege, as do state privilege laws. Thus, in some sense, they are less
on point than state privilege law. Federal Rule of Evidence 501, how-
ever, is not restricted to the "best evidence" of reason and experience.
148. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-703, 108 Stat.
1796, 1902-55 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
149. Congress, of course, could pass a new federal evidentiary rule recognizing a
particular privilege. Failure to do so, however, does not necessarily indicate that Con-
gress has rejected the privilege. Congress simply may not have focused on the issue or
it may have deliberately left it to the federal courts to formulate the privilege under
Rule 501.
150. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. See PREsSmE:s TASK FORCE ON VicTIms OF CRME, FiNAL REPORT (1982).
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Rather, it directs federal courts to develop the principles of common
law "in the light of reason and experience" utilizing any and all cir-
cumstances that they deem relevant. Furthermore, many federal ini-
tiatives do address the precise issues of confidentiality and thus
provide concrete "reason and experience" related to the development
of privileges. 153
C. FEDERAL COURTS
Congress did not instruct federal courts to freeze the law of privi-
leges; instead Congress instructed them to" 'continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges.'"154 While federal courts
should consider the experiences of other institutions in determining
whether a new privilege is justified, federal courts also have their own
experiences that are important in evaluating the propriety of a new
privilege. Courts are frequently asked to consider whether certain
communications should be protected from disclosure, regardless of
whether such communications fall within formally-recognized
privileges.
The parent-child privilege serves as a good example. Both state
and federal courts have been asked to recognize a parent-child privi-
lege but generally have chosen not to do so to date.155 Nevertheless,
federal courts may come to the opinion, based on their own "reason
and experience," that such a privilege should be recognized. This con-
clusion could result from considering the impact of the privilege in a
number of cases, or it could be from evaluating the totality of the cir-
cumstances in a particular case that finally demonstrates the wisdom
of the privilege. In either scenario, the court would need to conclude
that the privilege would support important private and public inter-
ests as the Supreme Court did in Jaffee or that it satisfies Wigmore's
criteria. 156
153. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
154. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
155. See, e.g., In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Inquest Proceedings,
676 A.2d 790, 794 (Vt. 1996); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith,
742 F.2d 398, 401 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Santarelli, 740 F.2d
816, 817 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982);
State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Hope v. State, 449 So. 2d 1319,
1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 553 F. Supp.
1298, 1322-25 (D. Nev. 1983) (adopting a parent-child testimonial privilege). At least
three states have statutorily recognized such a privilege. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7)
(Supp. 1996); MASs. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 233 § 20 (Supp. 1996). MiNN. STAT. § 595.02(j)
(Supp. 1997).
156. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (setting out
four prerequisites to the recognition of a privilege). See generally Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at
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D. SuMMARY
Although the Jaffee decision demonstrated the Supreme Court's
willingness to recognize new evidentiary privileges under Rule 501, it
did not provide a complete picture as to what information can be con-
sidered in evaluating "reason and experience." 157 Clearly, state privi-
lege laws are a valuable source for this analysis - whether or not
they evince unanimity or even a general consensus among the states.
However, they are not the only source. A federal court should also
consider federal activities related to the field of the prospective privi-
lege. Moreover, federal courts must not forget their own experiences.
There may be other sources to consider as well.
The important points to remember are that (1) Congress intended
federal courts to use "reason and experience" to continue the develop-
ment of new privileges, and (2) Jaffee did not limit (or quantify) the
potential sources for determining "reason and experience." Part III of
this Article will consider current "reason and experience" in the con-
text of crafting a counselor-battered woman privilege.
III. RECOGNITION OF THE COUNSELOR-BATTERED WOMAN
PRIVILEGE
Both federal and state governments recognize that domestic vio-
lence is a pressing national problem. Increased attention has focused
on the need to address the causes of domestic violence and to provide
assistance for its victims. One of the most basic and important as-
pects of assistance is counseling, which serves both the therapeutic
and safety needs of victims. Because a growing number of batterers
and rapists have attempted to gain access to the records of battered
women's counseling sessions, the necessity of a counselor-battered wo-
man privilege has become increasingly apparent.
While the Supreme Court in Jaffee chose not to delineate the "full
contours" of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, a counselor-bat-
tered woman privilege falls squarely within such contours.15 Society
has clearly recognized the impact that domestic violence has on fami-
lies and communities and has acted to combat this problem, including
by encouraging counseling. Battered women, like all psychotherapy
patients, expect their communications to be confidential. Indeed, con-
fidentiality is essential to successful counseling. In addition, both the
federal and state governments have passed numerous statutes, such
as VAWA and anti-stalking laws, and supported many programs to as-
1923-32. The authors use the parent-child privilege only for illustrative purposes. They
do not advocate for or against the recognition of this privilege.
157. See generally Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1923-32.
158. See id. at 1932.
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sist battered women.1 59 Moreover, during the past few years, many
states have enacted specific counselor-battered woman and more gen-
eral counselor-victim privileges to protect confidential communica-
tions. 160 With this collective "reason and experience," the holding in
Jaffee supports the recognition by federal courts of a counselor-bat-
tered woman privilege under Rule 501.161
A. SOCIETAL INTEREST IN ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Violence against women is an enormous problem throughout the
United States.162 The United States Department of Justice estimates
that three out of every four women will be the victims of a violent
crime at some point during their lives.163 At least two million Ameri-
can women are severely assaulted by their partners every year; some
experts put the number at closer to four million. 164 President Clinton
recently noted that in 1992, nearly 30 percent of all female homicide
victims were killed by husbands, former husbands, or boyfriends. 165
Furthermore, ongoing domestic abuse accounts for 22 percent to 35
percent of emergency room visits by women in the United States.166
159. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-703, 108
Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994); infra notes 205-37 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
161. The Jaffee Court confirms that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence au-
thorized "recognition of new privileges on a case-by-case basis." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at
1927 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059).
Thus, federal courts should be careful not to close the door on the development of a
counselor-battered woman privilege.
162. This section focuses on violence against women because the victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault are nearly always women. The United States Department
of Justice estimates that 95 percent of reported assaults on spouses or ex-spouses are
committed by men against women. Harriet Douglas, Assessing Violent Couples, 72(9)
F~smnms IN SOCIETY 525-535 (1991); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 81 (1987) (stating that
"there is no evidence that many women in fact commit rapes").
163. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WO-
MEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY (1995).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 4 (1994), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839,
1851-52 (finding by Congress that four million women are battered by their partners
each year); Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 117 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.) (noting that two million is
a conservative estimate and that most experts would agree that four million women is a
more accurate estimate). See also id. at 79 (noting from statistics that if every woman
victimized by domestic violence in a given year were to join hands, the line would extend
from New York to Los Angeles and back again); Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon
General, U.S. Public Health Service, A Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267
JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992).
165. See Proclamation No. 6829, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,879 (1995).
166. Teri Randall, Domestic Violence Intervention Calls for More Than Treating In-
juries, 264 JAMA 939, 939 (1990). See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to
Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1993) (noting Surgeon General's re-
port that "abuse inflicted by intimates constitutes one of the leading causes of injury to
women in the United States.").
1997]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
Fatality statistics only begin to reveal the extent of the devasta-
tion to America's families. Shattered bones, scratches, bruises, and
burns are the most visible consequences, but the emotional and psy-
chological harm can be equally severe. Battered women often fear for
their safety, expect violence to recur, lose their self-esteem, feel out-of-
control and trapped, develop an increased tolerance for violence and
abuse, and lose faith in others. 167 They commonly feel a sense of ter-
ror, depression, grief, anger, rage, hatred, and shame. 168 Battered
women also are known to develop nightmares, sexual dysfunctions,
concentration problems, and addictions. 169
The children of abused women also suffer enormously. Nearly
three million children witness their mothers being physically battered
each year. 170 As noted by Chief Justice Workman of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court:
Children learn several lessons in witnessing the abuse of
one of their parents. First, they learn that such behavior ap-
pears to be approved by their most important role models and
that the violence toward a loved one is acceptable. Children
also fail to grasp the full range of negative consequences for
the violent behavior and observe, instead, the short term
reinforcements, namely compliance by the victim. Thus, they
learn the use of coercive power and violence as a way to influ-
ence loved ones without being exposed to other more con-
structive alternatives.
In addition to the effect of the destructive modeling, chil-
dren who grow up in violent homes experience damaging psy-
chological effects. 171
These children may also suffer incidental injury from being pres-
ent during assaults on their mothers, or they may be targets of abuse
themselves.' 72 In addition, there is an intergenerational aspect to do-
mestic violence. It is well established that a male who witnesses fam-
ily violence as a child will be predisposed to committing family
violence as an adult.173
167. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1218-19
(1993).
168. Dutton, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 1221.
169. Id. at 1221-22.
170. Alan J. Tomkins et al., The Plight of Children who Witness Woman Battering:
Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 137, 139
(1994). See Dutton, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. at 1211.
171. Patricia Ann. S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 18 (W. Va. 1993) (Workman,
C.J., dissenting).
172. Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connections
and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 357 (1995) (noting "strong substantive correlation
between adult partner abuse and child abuse.").
173. Dutton, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. at 1211-12.
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B. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS SUPPORTING A COUNSELOR-
BATTERED WOMAN PRIVILEGE
Confidential counseling for victims of domestic violence is a ser-
vice of immense social value. To begin with, domestic violence pro-
grams are the most effective means for recovering physical and mental
health. These programs "offer a combination of services that cannot
be found in any other type of helping organization. 1 74 Shelter and
counseling services are "havens where [a battered woman] can
recuperate from her wounds, recover her sense of self, and re-evaluate
her situation. 1 75 It is therefore not surprising that Congress recently
appropriated at least $182 million for fiscal years 1996 through 2000
to support shelters where women can recuperate and receive
counseling.176
Counseling and shelter programs furnish a variety of services and
provisions, including hotlines, individual and group counseling, hous-
ing, advocacy services, physical protection, emergency medical care,
food, clothing, transportation, childcare, and outreach and education
programs. The counseling function is an integral part of these pro-
grams in two ways. First, by encouraging battered women to confide
in them, counselors are best able to evaluate the risks each batterer
poses and to help identify the services and legal interventions that
will enable a victim to escape the abuse.1 77 Second, a counselor can
provide psychological counseling appropriate to feelings of despair, de-
pression, fear, and shame, which will enable the victim to regain self-
confidence and leave the abusive relationship.' 78
Counselors are often former victims of domestic violence them-
selves. They are particularly qualified to assure the battered woman
that her situation is not unique.1 7 9 Counselors inform battered wo-
men that women of all ages, socio-economic classes, religions, races,
and cultures are battered by the men who profess to love them. Such
information may profoundly change the abused woman's understand-
174. LEE H. BOWKER, ENDING THE VIOLENCE 86 (1986).
175. DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 196 (1976).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10409(a), (b) (1994); id. at §§ 10402(a), (f). VAWA commits $1.62
billion over six years to combat family violence and sexual assault. See Michelle W.
Easterling, For Better or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic Violence, 98 W. VA. L.
REv. 933, 942-43 (1996).
177. BARBARA J. HART ET AL., PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY OF VICTIM-CoUNSELOR
COMMUNICATIONS 46 (Susan H. Rauch ed. 1993) [hereinafter PROTECTING
CONFIDENTIALITY].
178. See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 196-97 (1976); PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL-
rry, supra note 177, at 45-47.
179. See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATrERING AND HOW TO STOP IT
230 (1994) (asserting that shelter counselors should consist primarily of women who
have survived abuse).
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ing of her experience, permitting her to reject the excuses the batterer
advances as justification for his maltreatment. Thus, domestic vio-
lence services often provide critical counseling that helps the battered
woman affirm her integrity and reclaim her ability to resist the vio-
lence and to act effectively to protect herself and her children.' 80
Counselors function like psychotherapists, while also offering shared
experience to reduce isolation and rebuild the self-esteem of battered
women. Moreover, their counseling supplies the critical components
of strategic planning with victims for physical safety and access to
legal resources.
Counselors may be psychiatrists or psychotherapists, social work-
ers, clergy, attorneys, or volunteers with significant life experience. 181
The last category includes the survivors of abuse who have chosen to
help other battered women. As the Supreme Court recognized in Jaf-
fee, when extending the psychotherapist privilege to social workers,
social workers essentially serve the same function as psychothera-
pists.182 The difference between the groups is that social workers
often serve those who cannot afford psychotherapists.' 8 3 Indeed, the
Court agreed that differentiating between them would serve "no dis-
cernable public purpose.' 84
Recognizing substance over labels in the counselor-battered wo-
man relationship is especially compelling because this relationship
typically involves more sensitive and embarrassing personal disclo-
sures than those considered in other privileged relationships.' 85 To
do otherwise would condition the privilege on the victim's ability to
pay a formally licensed psychotherapist. Indeed, the counselor is
often the poor person's psychotherapist.' 8 6 As one commentator
stated:
[M]any domestic violence victims are economically dependent
on the men who abuse them[;] few victims have the resources
necessary to begin a new life for themselves and their chil-
dren. Batterers commonly isolate battered women from fi-
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181. Catherine M. Baytion, Toward Uniform Application of a Federal Psychothera-
pist-Patient Privilege, 70 WASH. L. REV. 153, 153 n.3 (1995).
182. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931-32.
183. Id. at 1931.
184. Id. at 1932 (quoting Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358 n.19).
185. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 146 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
186. See 23 CHARLEs A. WRIGrHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5429, at 819 (1980) (noting that the number of social workers exceeds the
combined number of psychiatrists, physicians and psychologists in low income areas).
Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358 n.19 (citations ommitted). The Supreme Court also acknowl-
edged that "social workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment."
Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
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nancial resources. For example, many battered women do
not have ready access to cash, checking accounts, or charge
accounts. One study showed that 27% of battered women had
no access to cash, 34% had no access to a checking account,
51% had no access.to charge accounts, and 22% had no access
to a car. 18
7
Recognizing a privilege for the psychotherapist and not the counselor
who performs the same function would draw an arbitrary
distinction. 88
Moreover, confidential counseling is essential to protecting the
safety of battered women and their children. Merely by seeking help,
battered women often expose themselves to grievous harm:
Most victims of domestic violence have been threatened with
further assault or even death if they ever reveal what their
abusers have done to them. Almost all battered women are
terrified of these threats.... Without assurances of confiden-
tiality, few battered women would contact domestic violence
programs or open up to battered women's counselors.' 8 9
Abused women have reason to believe the threats of their batterers:
The risk of violent assaults actually increases once a woman has made
an effort to leave or after she has left.190 Not only does non-fatal vio-
lence escalate, but deadly violence also increases.1 91 Women are most
likely to be murdered when attempting to report abuse or to leave an
abusive relationship. 192 Thus, confidentiality is not just helpful to de-
187. Martha F. Davis et al., Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141, 1150-51 (1995).
188. Catharina J.H. Dubbelday, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial
Privilege: Defining the Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 821 (1985) (noting that
"an approach that focuses only on the credentials of a professional seems arbitrary.").
Cf. Bernard v. Commonwealth, SJC-07023 1996 Mass. Lexis 331 (Mass. Dec. 27, 1996)
(extending statutory social worker privilege to unlicensed peer counselor employed by
the state). Failing to recognize a counselor-battered woman privilege would also dis-
criminate against women who wish to benefit from the specialized expertise of a domes-
tic violence counselor, even if they could afford a psychotherapist.
189. Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs
of Battered Women, 29 FAm. L.Q. 273, 295 (1995).
190. Zorza, 29 FAm. L.Q. at 274. See MARY P. Koss, ET AL., No SAFE HAVEN: MALE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AT HOME, AT WORK, AND IN THE COMMUNITY 98-99 (1994);
Dutton, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 1212; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991); J.M. Law-
rence, Fleeing Abuse Is Often Deadly For Women, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 15, 1995, at 26.
The Bureau of Justice has found that divorced or separated persons had the highest
rate of violent crimes committed against them by relatives. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990, 152
(1992).
191. See David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the
Judge, 13 RESPONSE 13, 13 (1990).
192. See Dutton, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 1212; Lan Nguyen, Police Say Man Stalked
Wife Before Killing Husband in Va. Slaying Suicide Was Arrested the Previous Day;
WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1995, at B1 (describing battered woman murdered by her husband
19971
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veloping the counseling relationship - it is often absolutely crucial to
insuring the woman's survival.' 93
The first step in communications between a counselor and a bat-
tered woman is to ensure the physical safety of the battered woman
whose life and whose children's lives continue to be at risk. Even if
the record of those confidential communications does not reveal the
victim's whereabouts, the very contents of the record may aggravate
the abuser and thereby increase the risk and level of physical violence.
Disclosure of a victim's fear, despair, and trauma resulting from the
assault confirms for a perpetrator that his acts of violence, threats,
and intimidation have been highly effective. Disclosure thus could en-
courage escalated coercion and sexual violence to maintain control
over a battered woman or to impede a battered woman's departure
from the relationship.
Since the inception of domestic violence counseling and shelter
services in the mid-1970s, domestic violence programs have recog-
nized that the safety of victims depends on their vigilance in protect-
ing the confidentiality of communications between victims and
counselors. Domestic violence programs take every precaution to en-
sure the confidentiality necessary to protect battered women from
their abusers.' 9 4 Most programs maintain confidentiality policies.' 95
Most train their counselors to refuse to disclose any information about
a battered woman without her consent.' 9 6 Shelters and counseling
programs have tailored telephone practices to prevent disclosure of
counseling relationships and communications. Domestic violence pro-
grams rarely publish the addresses of shelters and safe home services,
nor do they reveal the whereabouts of battered women once they leave
home.
Unless afforded robust legal protections, all of the communica-
tions so vigilantly protected in the interest of victims' safety may be
one day after he was arrested and released for stalking, and five months after
separation).
193. Fearing future retaliation and violence, battered women often make great ef-
forts to preserve the confidentiality of their location once they leave the batterer. Zorza,
29 FAM. L.Q. at 280. See CATHERINE KIRKwOOD, LEAVING ABUSIVE PARTNERS: FROM THE
SCARS OF SURVIVAL TO THE WISDOM FOR CHANGE 103 (1993) (describing efforts such as
paying utility bills under aliases to remove "any indication of existence.").
194. PROTECTING CONFmENTLrrY, supra note 177, at 47.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Statement of Confidentiality for My Sister's Place, Washington, D.C.
(providing that service volunteers "will never reveal the location of the shelter to any-
one" and that any information relating to clients "is confidential and not to be shared or
repeated to anyone."); PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 177, at 47, Appendix V
(noting that the Model Pennsylvania Confidentiality Policy provides that a women's
center and its employees will "hold confidential all communications, observations and
information made by, between, or about clients.").
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compromised when abusers succeed in extracting confidential infor-
mation under an exculpatory evidence argument. Giving batterers ac-
cess to confidential communications - whatever the grounds - raises
the prospect that the safety of battered women and their children will
be compromised, along with the safety of the people and organizations
who assist them. 197
Battered women often feel humiliated by their inability to stop
the violence of their abusers. 198 Few women would broach these most
private subjects without express assurances of confidentiality.' 99
Without a guarantee that her communications will be kept confiden-
tial, a woman who needs counseling may be afraid to seek assistance
at all.20 0 Few victims would divulge their private thoughts and feel-
ings, even though such disclosures are necessary to make recovery
possible. 201
Similarly, once the counseling relationship has begun, any risk of
disclosure necessarily inhibits the victim from freely revealing her
fears, feelings, and anxieties, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the
197. For example, domestic violence advocates are extremely concerned about the
privacy implications of modern technology, such as "caller ID" services and access to
private information over the internet. The Federal Communications Commission has
adopted rules requiring carriers to inform their customers as to what information
"caller ID" services reveal and how customers can activate and deactivate these serv-
ices. See In the Matter of Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification
Service-Caller ID, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC
Red 1764 (1994); In the Matter of Rules and Policies Regarding Caller Number Identifi-
cation-Caller ID, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, Second Report
and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd 11700 (1995).
198. Zorza, 25 FAM. L.Q. at 295.
199. Roberta L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law
Practitioner, 29 FAm. L.Q. 187, 187-88 (1995) (noting that "[V]ictims are not always
comfortable admitting to the violence in their homes. They have good reason to be mis-
trustful because our society has not yet shown it is willing to offer consistent support to
victims of domestic violence.").
200. See Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE L. REV. 175, 188-89 (1960); Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Mag-
istrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973) (quoting Report No. 45, Group for Advancement of
Psychiatry 92 (1960)).
201. The devastating effects of sexual assault present in many violent relationships
only magnifies the compelling need for a counseling relationship that enables the victim
to cope with her trauma. Rape affects its victims like no other crime. See Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Pa. 1992). "A rape victim suffers an invasion of
her bodily privacy in an intensely personal and unsettling manner, triggering a number
of emotional and psychological reactions running the gamut from shock, fear, distrust
and anger to guilt, shame and disgust." In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d
at 138 (Larsen, J., dissenting). The traumatizing effects have been labeled "Rape
Trauma Syndrome." Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting). "The benefits of counseling to a rape
victim inure to the benefit of those in ... relationships with her, and unless ... victims
are encouraged and provided with an opportunity for therapy, many women and their
relationships will be mere 'shells.' Id. at 140 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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counseling.202 Any hesitation to disclose this sensitive information to
a counselor impairs the counselor's ability to help the victim make a
full recovery. 20 3
Confidentiality also is necessary to reestablish and protect the
dignity of women who have been abused or assaulted. Assuring confi-
dentiality demonstrates to the victim that her concerns and feelings
are significant and worthy of protection, thus helping to rebuild her
dignity. The forced betrayal of a victim's confidences would further
damage her dignity. Indeed, it would be a "great irony" that a batterer
could safely confess to his attorney the details of the crime he has com-
mitted, with full confidence that this information is not available to
others to be used against him during trial, but that the victim of such
an assault has no such guarantee. 20 4
C. THE "REASON AND EXPERIENCE" OF STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTS
Congress and many state legislatures have responded to domestic
violence by enacting legislation to aid its victims. For example, Con-
gress enacted the Family Violence Prevention Services Act 20 5 and the
Victims of Crime Act20 6 to provide funds to assist battered women and
other victims of domestic violence. These Acts earmark funds "for the
purpose of providing immediate shelter and related assistance to vic-
tims of family violence."207 Similarly, the recently enacted VAWA pro-
vides grants to combat violent crimes against women, to reduce sexual
assaults against women, to encourage arrest policies, to support bat-
tered women's shelters, to gather stalking data, and to fund a national
domestic violence hotline to facilitate access to information and assist-
ance for battered women.208 VAWA also created criminal penalties
202. See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d at 146-47 & n.2 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
203. See PROTECTING CoNFDmE.NrILrry, supra note 177, at 46 (describing need for
complete and accurate details for counselor to be able to assess level of danger, design a
safety plan, and consider legal options).
204. See People v. Pena, 487 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
205. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-18 (1994).
206. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-07 (1994).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 10402(f) (1994).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 40211 (1994). Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 40121, 40151, 40211, 40241, 40602, 108 Stat. 1910, 1920, 1925, 1934, 1951 (1994).
Still, resources are scarce, and the demand for shelters far exceeds their capacity. As of
1994, there were 1,842 domestic violence programs in the United States, including
1,268 shelter programs. See National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Available
Services for Battered Women in the United States (1994) (calculations by S.B. Plichta &
J.M. Lee, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine) (on file with the Creighton Law Review). In
Massachusetts, 71 percent of the women seeking shelter and 80 percent of the children
are turned away by women's shelters. In Philadelphia, one shelter rejects 75 percent of
the women who seek shelter. Another shelter in New York City turns away one hun-
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for incidents of interstate domestic violence, including stiff jail
terms.209
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted civil pro-
tection order statutes that afford broad relief to adult and child vic-
tims of domestic violence. 2 10 The relief provided by state codes
includes injunctions against future violence, exclusion from the family
domicile, support, custody, relinquishment of weapons, and payment
of losses and attorneys' fees. 2 1 ' Some states now require police de-
partments to respond to domestic violence incidents in the same man-
ner as they would respond to offenses involving strangers 21 2 States
dred battered women and their children every week. ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE
DEAD: BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT 229-30 (1994). In 1995, 1,669 women and 2,209
children were housed in Massachusetts' battered women's shelters. The Woman Abuse
Tracking in Clinics and Hospitals Project, Division of Prevention, Bureau of Family and
Community Health, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Massachusetts Data
on Intimate Partner Violence (1996) (on file with the CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW).
209. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 40221, 108 Stat. 19 (1994).
210. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-1 to -5-11 (1995 & Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 25.35.010 to .050 (Michie 1995); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601 to -3602 (West
Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-101, -205, -206 (Michie 1995); CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 6300 - 6380 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-4-101 to -105 (1995 &
Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 1041 - 1048 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1005 (1995 & Supp. 1996);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(5) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-13-1 to -22
(1991 & Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 586-1 to -11 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-6301 to -
6317 (1993 & Supp. 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/101 to 401, 60/102 (West 1993
Supp. 1996); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-5.1-1 to -5.1-9 (1986 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE § 236.1
to .18 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3101 to -3111 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 403.710 to .785 (Banks-Baldwin 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2135 (West 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 761-A to 770 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW
§§ 4-501 to -516 (1991 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 1 to 9 (West
1987 & Supp. 1996); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2950 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996);
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (1990 & Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-1 to -29 (1994 &
Supp. 1996); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010 to .538 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-101 to
-303 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-905 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33.017 to .100
(Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:1 to -B:11(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-1 to -
13-8 (Michie 1994); N.Y. FAMILy CT. ACT §§ 828, 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1 to -9 (McKinney 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-07.1-01 to -18
(Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.25 to .271 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 40.2 to 40.3 (1992 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.045,
192.445 (1995); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 6101-17.(1991 & Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 15-15-1 to -8 (1988 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-4-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-10-1 to -33 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601 to -620 (1991 & Supp. 1995); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.01 to .19 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-1 to -14 (1995 & Supp. 1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101 to -1115 (1989 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-251 to
253.4 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.060, to .070 (West
1986 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-1 to -14 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 813.12 -
.122 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-21-101 to -107 (Michie 1994).
211. See supra note 210.
212. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.080 (1994). Of course, implicit in this require-
ment is the unfortunate fact that in the absence of legislation, many police officers re-
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likewise have passed mandatory arrest statutes that require police to
arrest an abuser if they have probable cause to believe that an assault
has occurred or that a protective order has been violated.213 More re-
cently, almost all states and the District of Columbia have enacted
"anti-stalking" laws, criminalizing harassment that threatens death
or serious injury.214 In addition, an increasing number of states are
adopting laws requiring consideration of evidence of domestic abuse
when making child custody decisions.215
Both federal and state lawmakers have recognized the impor-
tance of protecting the privacy of battered women and the confidenti-
gard domestic violence as less serious than other violent crimes even though the
statistics show that women are far more likely to be assaulted or killed by their part-
ners than by strangers. See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1993) (noting that as many as 40 percent of
calls to police involve domestic disturbances).
213. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West 1995); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-
1031 (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.1225
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C 25-21 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 133.055(2)(a) (1995).
214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to
.270 (Michie Supp. 1995); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (West Supp. 1996); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. CIvIL CODE § 1708.7 (West Supp.
1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (1986 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-
181c to -181d (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (1995 & Supp. 1996); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-90 to 93 (1996); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 711-1106.4 to -1106.5 (1993 & Supp. 1995);
IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1996); 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.3 to -7.5 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE §§ 35-45-10-1, -10-4, -10-5 (1994 & Supp. 1996); IOwA
CODE § 708.11 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.140
to .150 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1996); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 121B
(1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.411h to .411i (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-107 (1994 & Supp. 1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.225 (1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-220 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02 to .05 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.575 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:12-10 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3A-1 to 3A-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL
LAw §§ 120.13 to .14, 240.25 to .31 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-277.3 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.211 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (Supp. 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.730 to .755 (1995); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 18, § 2709 (Supp. 1996); R.I.
GEN. LAws. § 11-59-1 to -59-3 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 to 184
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-19A-1 to -19A-7 (Supp. 1996); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (West Supp. 1995); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.071 (West Supp.
1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1995 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 1061 to 1063 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.32 (West 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (Michie 1996).
215. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (1985 &
Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990 & Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West
1993). See also In re Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434 (Mass. 1996) (creating a judi-
cially crafted rule).
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ality of their dealings with support services. 21 6 The Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act, for example, forbids grants to any pro-
gram without "documentation that procedures have been developed
... to assure the confidentiality of records pertaining to any individual
provided family violence prevention or treatment services.. -217 Ad-
ditionally, the United States Postal Service is required to implement
new regulations "to secure the confidentiality of domestic violence
shelters and abused persons' addresses."218 Because many shelters
and counseling programs receive federal funding, they must resist all
attempts to divulge confidential information about the battered wo-
men they serve.
Moreover, in December 1995, the United States Department of
Justice released a report to Congress concerning the issue of confiden-
tiality of communications between sexual assault or domestic violence
victims and their counselors. 219 The Department proposed model
statutes to encourage victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence to
seek counseling, make full disclosures to their counselors, and receive
the maximum benefits from counseling.220
Similarly, state legislatures have acted specifically to protect the
confidentiality of battered women by restricting access to information
that would reveal their locations. 22' For example, some states re-
quire, or at least allow, courts to keep addresses of battered women
confidential. 222 Others permit a victim to remove her driver's license
and registration information from the public record.223 Colorado al-
lows a battered woman to make any public record confidential if she
submits an affidavit stating that she believes she will be harassed or
threatened with bodily harm.2 24 New Jersey and Washington enable
216. See infra notes 217-32 and accompanying text.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 10402(a)(2)(E) (1994). The Victims of Crime Act contains a similar
provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 10604(a) (1994).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 13951 (1994).
219. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on the Confidentiality of Communications
Between Sexual Assault or Domestic Violence Victims and Their Counselors, Findings
and Model Legislation (1995).
220. Id. This effort builds on earlier work by the President's Task Force on Victims
of Crime, which recommended that legislation be enacted "to ensure that designated
victim counseling is legally privileged and not subject to defense discovery or subpoena."
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 17 (1982). The recom-
mendation specifically included a privilege that would cover social workers, nurses, and
victim counselors, not just psychiatrists and psychologists. Id.
221. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 209A, § 8 (West 1987); N.J. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-26 (West 1995); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.111 (West 1996); Wis.-STAT.
ANN. § 813.125 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995), id. at § 5895.67 (West Supp. 1996).
223. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-50-906 to -908 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 1808.21 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 171.12 (1986 & Supp.
1997).
224. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204 (1988 & Supp. 1996).
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a battered woman to register to vote without disclosing her street
address.225
Washington also manages the most sweeping confidentiality sys-
tem - the Address Confidentiality Program - that effectively assists
battered women to disappear.226 Under this program, a battered wo-
man may list a post office box supplied by the Secretary of State's of-
fice as her address.227 State employees then forward mail to her real
address. 228 Moreover, she may seal her records to prevent anyone
from locating her.22 9 Shelters, in coordination with the State, relocate
the battered woman.230
All of these programs and policies demonstrate "reason and expe-
rience" at the state and federal level to strengthen counseling and
assistance for battered women, including protecting their confidential-
ity. The most telling evidence of "reason and experience," however, is
that many states have also enacted statutory privileges to guard the
confidentiality of communications between a counselor and a crime
victim. A number of states have enacted a counselor-battered woman
privilege. 231 Additionally, many states have enacted a more general
counselor-victim privilege. 232 The enactment of these privilege stat-
utes has been a recent trend with most statutes having been passed
since 1980. Because of increasing societal awareness about the prob-
lem of domestic violence, it is highly likely that many more states will
225. See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-26, 19:31-3.2 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 40.24.010 to .070 (West Supp. 1997). The New Jersey legisla-
ture enacted its statute after a court held that a battered woman could register to vote
without disclosing her street address. See D.C.v. Superintendent of Elections, 618 A.2d
931, 932 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1992).
226. See WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 40.24.010 to .900 (West Supp. 1997); WASH AD-
MIN. CODE §§ 434-840-001 to -370 (1996).
227. WASH. ADmn . CODE § 434-840-020 (1996).
228. Id. at §§ 434-840-020 & -030.
229. Id.
230. During its first four years in operation, the program has served approximately
600 clients. Nancy Cleeland, One State Helps Women Get Away, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRm., July 10, 1994, at A22.
231. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.059, § 25.35.052(a) (1996). CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1037.2 (West 1995); CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146k (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); 225
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 107/75 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2124.1 (West Supp.
1997); MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 233, § 20J (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); MicH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2157a (West 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-18 (1991 & Supp.
1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-C:1, 173-C:2 (1994); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 42, § 5945.1
(Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-12-116 (1988) 14-3-210 (1994). More than half of the
states have enacted statutes addressing the confidentiality of communications between
counselors and sexual assault or domestic violence victims. Dep't of Justice, Report to
Congress on the Confidentiality of Communications Between Sexual Assault or Domes-
tic Violence Victims and Their Counselors, Findings and Model Legislation 3 (1995).
232. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-40 to -45 (1995); IND. CODE §§ 35-37-6-1 to 11
(1994); IOWA CODE § 236A.1 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-22.13 to -22.15; 84A-29
(West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-1 to -6 (Michie 1994).
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follow this trend and enact their own privilege statutes. However,
even if they do not, there are sufficient grounds for a judicially crafted
response in this area.
At least one federal district court has taken the first step. In
United States v. Lowe,233 the United States District. Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts confronted the question of whether to extend
the federal privilege to rape counseling records.234 The court rea-
soned that Jaffee was not technically on point because the communica-
tions were made to "a rape crisis center employee or volunteer" and
not a "licensed social worker or psychotherapist."23 5 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that "the policies expressed in Jaffee" supported
"some form of a federal privilege'for communications with a rape crisis
counselor .... -"236 The court reached this conclusion after noting that
a majority of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted
privileges for confidential communications between counselors and
victims of sexual assault or domestic violence. 237
CONCLUSION
Jaffee confirmed that Rule 501 permits federal courts to use "rea-
son and experience" to recognize new privileges. The facts of Jaffee
provided the Court with the opportunity to recognize a psychothera-
pist privilege and then extend the privilege to the social worker con-
text. The Court, however, did not foreclose broadening the privilege to
other counseling relationships. As many states have recognized, the
counselor-battered woman relationship is an appropriate further ex-
tension of the psychotherapist privilege. Not only does the counselor-
battered woman relationship satisfy the traditional Wigmore ele-
ments, but "reason and experience" at the state and federal levels in-
dicate that a counselor-battered woman privilege is necessary to assist
victims of domestic violence in their healing process.
233. No. Crim. 95-10404-PBS, 1996 WL 713070 (D. Mass. 1996) (Substitute Memo-
randum and Order).
234. United States v. Lowe, No. Crim. 95-10404-PBS, 1996 WL 713070, at *1 (D.
Mass. 1996) (Substitute Memorandum and Order).
235. Lowe, 1996 WL 713070, at *2.
236. Id.
237. Id. The court, however, decided that the rape victim in Lowe had waived her
privilege. Id. at *2-3.
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